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Two studies showed that emotion expressions serve as cues to the expresser’s willingness 
to take risks in general, as well as in five risk domains (ethical, financial, health and safety, 
recreational, and social). Emotion expressions did not have a uniform effect on risk 
estimates across risk domains. Rather, these effects fit behavioral intentions associated 
with each emotion. Thus, anger expressions were related to ethical and social risks. 
Sadness reduced perceived willingness to take financial (Study 1 only), recreational, and 
social risks. Happiness reduced perceived willingness to take ethical and health/safety 
risks relative to neutrality. Disgust expressions increased the perceived likelihood of taking 
a social risk. Finally, neutrality increased the perceived willingness to engage in risky 
behavior in general. Overall, these results suggest that observers use their naïve 
understanding of the meaning of emotions to infer how likely an expresser is to engage 
in risky behavior.
Keywords: emotion expression, risk taking, social perception, risk domain, person perception
INTRODUCTION
Occasionally a person may need to estimate the extent to which another individual is willing 
to take a risk. This is the case, for example, when a financial advisor is asked to make a 
recommendation for a prospective investor, when a doctor advises a patient about possible 
treatments or when negotiators attempt to figure out what offer they could put on the table 
without their counterparts backing off. One important question that arises in such a situation 
is how observers can estimate or judge the risk proneness of another person, especially when 
that person is unknown to them.
Relatively few studies have examined this question, but two sources of information have 
been isolated. First, a person’s own risk proneness serves as an anchor for judging other 
people’s risk proneness (e.g., Hsee and Weber, 1997; Chakravarty et  al., 2011). A second source 
of information is stereotype information related to the social identity of the other person such 
as their age (Rosen and Jerdee, 1976) or gender (Siegrist et  al., 2002). In the present research, 
we  suggest that observers might use a third cue for their judgment: the other’s emotional 
state as reflected by their emotional expression.
According to appraisal theories of emotion, specific emotions are differentiated by their pattern 
of appraisals (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987; Lazarus, 1991). Emotions are responses to major 
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concerns of the individual (Frijda, 1986) and prepare the individual 
to respond appropriately to the emotion eliciting event (Frijda, 
1988). This implies that an appraisal pattern associated with a 
specific emotion is also associated with a specific action tendency 
or action readiness. These are behaviors that address the issue 
that gave rise to the emotion in the first place (Frijda, 1986; 
Scherer, 2005). For example, fear is associated with tendencies 
to engage in protective behavior, often in flight. By contrast, 
anger is linked with a tendency to move against, to oppose the 
source of the anger (Frijda et  al., 1989). Thus, specific emotions 
are associated both with specific appraisals as well as specific 
behaviors (Roseman et  al., 1994).
People are aware of the link between emotions, appraisals, 
and action tendencies and can use this awareness to deduce 
from emotional expressions how the expresser appraises the 
situation and what they are likely to do next (Hareli and Hess, 
2019). For example, if someone shows fear in reaction to an 
event, protective behavior is a likely action tendency. That is, 
emotional expressions can serve as cues to others about the 
expresser’s behavioral intentions and motives (Fridlund, 1994), 
and indicate an intention to act in a specific way (Scarantino, 2017).
Therefore, in a given context, the interactants’ emotion 
expressions should limit the range of likely actions to those 
that are congruent with the underlying action tendency. For 
example, when someone shows anger, an observer may assume 
(a) that this person is unlikely to behave in ways that are not 
associated with anger, such as staying away or remaining passive, 
and (b) that this person is more likely to behave in ways that 
are associated with the behavior typical of the emotion, such 
as acting against someone else.
The present research focuses on inferences regarding potential 
risk-taking by an emoter. Specifically, we  consider the effect 
of knowing that a person is angry or sad on the perceived 
risk proneness of the expresser. Anger is associated with a 
tendency to move against its object and sadness with a tendency 
to remain inactive. In a given context, it may not be  actually 
the case that someone can move against someone else or have 
the option to be inactive, rather, the underlying action tendencies 
will play out in ways appropriate to the context. Thus, in a 
risk-taking context, anger and sadness should be  indicative of 
the risk-taking willingness of the emoter in ways that are 
suitable to that context.
For example, since an angry person signals a willingness 
to move against the anger-eliciting object, something that is 
likely to involve a risk, anger may be  seen as an indication 
that the individual is prepared to engage in other risks as 
well. By contrast, because sadness is associated with a tendency 
towards inaction, this may be  taken as a more general sign 
that the emoter will avoid risky action.
People’s preference to take risks varies across different life 
domains (Soane and Chmiel, 2005; Blais and Weber, 2006; 
Hanoch et  al., 2006). That is individuals do not appear to 
be  consistently risk seeking or risk averse across different 
domains and situations. For example, Wang et al. (2009) looked 
at the effect of birth status on risk-taking propensity in different 
domains. They found that those who were born last in the 
family were more likely to take a risk involving an environmental 
challenge such as exploring a new place than their older siblings. 
By contrast, they were as likely as their older siblings to take 
a risk involving competition with others such as taking a 
leading role in one’s group. Perceived willingness to take risks 
may also be expected to be domain specific and be differentially 
determined by the type of emotion perceived.
As mentioned above, observers associate emotions with 
specific action tendencies (Frijda, 1986). For example, moving 
against another is more typical of an angry person than a 
happy one (Frijda et  al., 1989). By contrast, happiness is 
associated with a tendency or urge to play and broaden one’s 
experience (Fredrickson, 2004). Hence, observers are more 
likely to assume that someone who is angry will act aggressively 
than in a playful way. Aggression involves a risk in the social 
and ethical domains. Any act in the recreational domain, which 
in many cases involves some playful spirit, is less likely for 
an angry person. Accordingly, taking a risk in this domain 
also may seem less plausible. By contrast, it is plausible that 
a happy person is perceived to be  more likely to take a risk 
in a domain associated with play, for example, by engaging 
in a more dangerous recreational activity such as sky diving, 
but not necessarily to take a financial risk on the stock market 
or taking a risk involving ethical issues.
We report the results of two studies testing (a) the notion 
that emotion expressions can be  used as cues to risk taking 
and (b) that different emotions are indicative of different types 
of risk taking.
STUDY 1
To test the idea that people use others’ emotional expressions 
as cues to risk proneness, participants saw a photo of a man 
or a woman expressing either sadness, anger, or neutrality (as 
a control condition). Participants were told that the photo 
depicts how the person reacted to a specific event and therefore 
represents the person’s current state of mind. Participants were 
then asked to assess the emoter’s willingness to take risks in 
five risk domains: ethical, financial, health and safety, recreational, 
and social (Blais and Weber, 2006). We  focused on expressions 
of anger and sadness since, as noted above, these two emotions 
are associated with different action tendencies that are relevant 
to risk taking. We  predicted that an angry person will 
be  perceived as more likely to engage in risky behavior than 
a sad person. We  included a neutral expression as a control 
condition to assess if any effects found are due to increased 
perceived risk-taking for anger or decreased perceived risk-
taking for sadness or both. Based on previous research, we also 
expected that, regardless of the type of emotion shown, men 
would seem more likely to take risks than women due to 
gender stereotypes related to risk taking (Siegrist et  al., 2002).
Method
Participants
In total, 224 (120 women) participants with a mean age of 
42  years (SD  =  12.88) who were recruited through Amazon 
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MTurk completed the study and passed control questions 
probing for attention. Based on a sensitivity analysis using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), given our sample size, the minimum 
effect size that the experiment had 80% power to detect was 
f  =0.21.
Stimulus Materials
Facial expressions of anger, sadness, and neutrality by four 
young men and women were taken from the FACES database 
of facial expressions (Ebner et  al., 2010).
Procedure and Dependent Measures
After consent was obtained, participants were told that taking 
risks is very common and that people engage in different 
types of risk-taking activities daily. Thus, whereas some people 
take many risks, others prefer to take very few. They were 
further told that people are frequently asked to make risky 
decisions for other people, not just for themselves such as 
when parents have to make risky decisions on behalf of their 
children and children are asked to make risky decisions on 
behalf of their parents. There are many other occasions and 
situations (such as at work or in a social context), where 
people make risky decisions. The goal of this part was to 
convey that taking risks is quite common but also that the 
willingness to take risks varies between people. Then, participants 
were told that in this study we  are interested to test how 
people infer the degree to which another person is likely to 
engage in different risky activities.
Then, participants were informed that they will see a 
photograph depicting how an unknown person reacted to a 
specific event. Each participant saw and rated only one picture. 
They were asked to assume that the photo represents the 
person’s present state of mind. This was done to provide 
participants with a reason why the photos may include an 
emotional expression. Participants were then asked to look at 
the photo and rate the likelihood that this person would engage 
in different risky activities. For descriptions of risky activities 
or behaviors, we  used the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking 
(DOSPERT) scale (Blais and Weber, 2006). This is the 30-item 
version of the DOSPERT scale, which is designed to evaluate 
behavioral intentions, or the likelihood with which respondents 
might engage in risky activities or behaviors originating from 
five domains (i.e., ethical, financial, health and safety, social, 
and recreational risks). Since the original scale measures a 
person’s own likelihood of engaging in each behavior, the scale 
was modified so that it referred to another person. Responses 
were made using a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1: Extremely 
Unlikely to 7: Extremely Likely. Item scores for each subscale 
were summed by adding up all items of a given subscale to 
obtain subscale scores. Thus, higher scores indicate a greater 
perceived willingness to take risks in a specific domain described 
by the items of the subscale. The full DOSPERT, in its original 
form, can be interpreted as a generalized risk propensity measure 
(Mishra and Lalumière, 2011). Accordingly, in the present 
context, it can be seen as reflecting the other person’s perceived 
generalized risk propensity. This measure was computed by 
averaging ratings across life domains.
Finally, as a manipulation check, we  asked participants to 
rate the degree to which the person in the photo expressed 
anger, sadness, and neutrality. These ratings were also made 
on a 7-point rating scale ranging from 0: Not at all to 6: To 
a large extent.
The data from this study as well as from Study 2 are openly 




A 3 (expressed emotion: anger, sadness, and neutral)  ×  2 
(expresser gender) between-subjects analysis of variance was 
conducted on ratings of anger, sadness, and neutrality. The 
expected main effect of emotion expression was significant for 
all emotion conditions, anger: F(2,218)  =  39.13, p  <  0.001, 
ηp2  =  0.26, sadness: F(2,218)  =  59.33, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.35, 
neutrality: F(2,218)  =  60.49, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.36. Post-hoc 
tests (p  <  0.05) revealed that, for anger, displays of anger were 
rated as the angriest (M  =  5.12, SD  =  1.18, CI95% 4.71; 5.53) 
and displays of sadness appeared as least angry (M  =  2.76, 
SD  =  2.11, CI95% 2.31; 3.06) with displays of neutrality being 
perceived as reflecting an intermediate level of anger (M = 3.22, 
SD = 1.73, CI95% 3; 3.73). Expressions of sadness were perceived 
as most sad (M  =  4.75, SD  =  1.49, CI95% 4.39; 5.11) and 
expressions of anger as least sad (M  =  1.82, SD  =  1.62, CI95% 
1.43; 2.21) with neutral expressions perceived as showing an 
intermediate level of sadness (M  =  3.37, SD  =  1.68, CI95% 3.01; 
3.71). Finally, a neutral expression seemed most neutral 
(M  =  3.65, SD  =  1.67, CI95% 3.3; 4) and expressions of anger 
(M  =  1.3, SD  =  1.65, CI95% 0.92; 1.69) and sadness (M  =  1.14, 
SD  =  1.47, CI95% 0.78; 1.51) were perceived similarly and as 
less neutral. Overall, as these results suggest, the expressions 
of emotions were perceived as intended.
Perceived Willingness to Engage in Risky 
Behaviors
First, we  assessed the internal consistency of each of the 
subscales of the modified DSOPERT used in our study. Scores 
ranged from α = 0.68 to α = 0.86 (αsocial = 0.68, αrecreational = 0.86, 
αfinancial  =  0.82, αhealth/safety  =  0.85, and, αethical  =  0.84). Thus, 
overall, the scale showed adequate reliability. To test the effect 
of emotion expressions on perceived risk-taking likelihood, 
we  conducted a series of two-way ANOVAs with emotion 
expression (anger, sadness, and neutral) and gender (men and 
women) as between-subjects factors for each risk domain 
separately, as well as for the combined measure reflecting 
generalized perceived risk propensity.
As shown in the first row of Table  1, the expected main 
effect of emotion was significant for the generalized perceived 
risk propensity as well as for all five risk domains. Across all 
ratings, as expected, anger led to an increased perception of 
risk proneness relative to sadness. In most life domains, except 
for the domains of ethics and health/safety, sadness led to 
less perceived risk proneness than neutrality. The risk proneness 
of people who expressed anger was in most cases rated similarly 
Hareli et al. Emotions and Perceived Risk Taking
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 655314
to that of people who showed neutrality. Only for the domain 
of ethics and the social domain, were ratings for anger higher 
than for neutrality.
As shown on Table  2 and as expected, for some of the 
risk domains as well as the generalized risk propensity, a gender 
effect emerged such that men were seen as more likely to 
engage in risks than women. This was not the case for the 
social and ethical domains. For the ethics domain there was 
no effect for gender; in the social domain, an interaction 
between gender and expressed emotions qualified these main 
effects, F(2,218)  =  3.87, p  =  0.02, ηp2  =  0.03. Post-hoc tests 
(p  <  0.05) revealed that whereas women seemed equally likely 
to take a social risk regardless of the emotion that they expressed 
(Mneutral  =  28.07; SD  =  4.17, CI95% 26.48; 29.67, Manger  =  30.3; 
SD  =  5.76, CI95% 28.5; 32.1, and, Msadness  =  25.89; SD  =  6.56, 
CI95% 24.22; 27.57) men who expressed sadness (M  =  23.26, 
SD  =  5.69, CI95% 21.59; 24.94) were perceived as less likely to 
take risks than men who expressed anger (M = 31.67; SD = 4.3, 
CI95% 29.87; 33.47) or neutrality (M  =  29.65; SD  =  4.63, CI95% 
28.02; 31.47). Effects sizes for the emotion effect ranged from 
small to medium.
Overall, these findings confirm that ratings of risk proneness 
were informed by incidental emotion expressions. Further, the 
effect of emotion expressions on the perception of risk proneness 
was not uniform across risk domains. This is congruent with 
findings for people’s own willingness to take risks (Soane and 
Chmiel, 2005; Hanoch et  al., 2006; Figner and Weber, 2011). 
Notably, the significant effects of sadness and anger on perceived 
risk proneness, were always the same. Specifically, in line with 
our hypothesis, anger increased perceived willingness to take 
risks and sadness decreased it.
These findings are congruent with the notion that an action 
tendency of moving against, attacking, or removing an 
obstruction, signals to observers a willingness to also take 
risks other than the risk involved in moving against the other 
person. For sadness, the tendency to become inactive, seek 
help or recover, also seems to extend to a general tendency 
to be  inactive and hence to not seek risks. However, the effect 
of sadness was more pervasive than the effect of anger as it 
had an impact on more risk domains than anger. In other 
words, it may be  clearer to observers that someone who is 
inactive, or attempting to recover, is unlikely to engage in 
risky behavior. That someone who is inclined to attack or 
move against someone, may be  taken as less indication that 
this inclination extends to other types of risks as well. In 
Study 2, we  attempted to substantiate and extend 
these conclusions.
STUDY 2
Study 1, is the first, to our knowledge, to demonstrate that 
observers consider others’ sadness and anger as informative 
when evaluating the emoter’s likelihood to engage in risky 
behavior in general as well as in specific domains of risk. 
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Higher means reflect a higher level of perceived propensity to take risks. Within each row means marked by small letters differ significantly at least at p < 0.05.
TABLE 2 | Perceptions of the willingness to take risks as a function of target 
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In Study 2, we aimed to extend our findings by including disgust 
and happiness expressions along with expressions of sadness.
A growing body of research shows the significant role of 
disgust in determining risk-taking behaviors. This is based 
on the notion that disgust is an emotion that functions to 
regulate exposure to potential harm from contaminated 
resources. As such, it can be  seen as a mechanism for risk 
avoidance related to contamination (Tybur and Lieberman, 
2016; Sparks et  al., 2018). Yet it has been suggested that 
disgust also functions to regulate decisions in the context of 
mate choice and morality (Tybur et  al., 2013). As such, one 
may expect that expressions of disgust will be  perceived as 
indicating a reduced willingness to take risks, in particular, 
those that are related to health and safety, ethics, and maybe 
also risks in the social domain.
The expressions examined in Study 1 were of negative emotions. 
However, positive emotions are also relevant in this context. 
Happiness is associated with a tendency or urge to play and 
broaden one’s experience (Fredrickson, 2004). Thus, a happy 
person may be  seen as more inclined to afford taking risks. 
This may be  more restricted to domains that match a happy 
state such as the recreational domain than the risk in domains 
that are likely to ruin the person’s happiness if the outcome is 
undesirable. Such may be  the case in the domain of health or 
the financial domain. Accordingly, observers may assume that 
happy people are more likely to engage in risky behavior, at 
least relative to sad and disgusted people who in general are 
expected to avoid risks as detailed above. Nevertheless, based 
on our finding from Study 1, we  expected sadness to decrease 
to a lesser degree the person’s perceived willingness to engage 
in risky behavior in the domains of health and safety, and ethics.
Method
Participants
In total, 411 (216 women) participants with a mean age of 
42  years (SD  =  13.67) who were recruited through Amazon 
MTurk completed the study and passed control questions 
probing for attention. Based on a sensitivity analysis using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), given our sample size, the minimum 
effect size that the experiment had 80% power to detect was 
f  =  0.21.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
Facial expressions of sadness, disgust, happiness, and neutrality 
by four young men and women were taken from the FACES 
database of facial expressions (Ebner et al., 2010). The procedure 
was the same as in Study 1 and hence will not be  described 
here again. Measures were also the same as in Study 1, with 
the exception that for the manipulation check participants were 
asked, in addition, to rate perceived disgust and happiness. 
Since disgust is often confused with anger (see, e.g., Knutson, 
1996; Du and Martinez, 2011), we  included this rating scale 
in this study as well.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
A 4 (emotion expression: disgust, sadness, happiness, and 
neutral) X 2 (expresser gender) between-subjects analysis of 
variance was conducted on ratings of disgust, sadness, happiness, 
anger, and neutrality. A main effect of emotion expression 
emerged significantly for all emotion scales, disgust: 
F(3,403) = 146.25, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.52, sadness: F(3,403) = 68.44, 
p  <  .001, ηp2  =  0.34, happiness: F(3,403)  =  173.38, p  <  0.001, 
ηp2  =  0.56, anger: F(3,403)  =  49.88, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.27, and 
neutrality: F(3,403)  =  79.22, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.37. Post-hoc 
tests (p  <  0.05) revealed that, disgust expressions were rated 
as showing a greater degree of disgust (M  =  5.3; SD  =  0.8, 
CI95% 5.02; 5.58) than all other expressions, with happiness 
showing less disgust (M  =  1.02; SD  =  1.55, CI95% 0.73; 1.32) 
than sadness (M = 2.48; SD = 1.79, CI95% 2.41; 3.05) or neutrality 
(M = 2.48; SD = 2.02, CI95% 2.14; 2.8) which were rated similarly. 
Sad expressions were perceived as most sad (M = 4.51; SD = 1.58, 






































































Higher means reflect a higher level of perceived propensity to take risks. Within each row, means marked by small letters differ significantly at least at p < 0.05.
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CI95% 4.15; 4.83); expressions of disgust (M  =  2.24; SD  =  1.88, 
CI95% 1.94; 2.55) and neutrality (M  =  2.61; SD  =  1.76, CI95% 
2.23; 2.95) were rated similarly and as somewhat sadder than 
expressions of happiness (M  =  1.11; SD  =  1.55, CI95% 0.79; 
1.44). Expressions of happiness were rated as happiest (M = 5.26; 
SD  =  0.88, CI95% 4.97; 5.55) with neutrality being somewhat 
happier (M  =  2.05; SD  =  1.73, CI95% 1.73; 2.37) than disgust 
(M = 1.25; SD = 1.68, CI95% 0.97; 1.52) and sadness (M = 1.09; 
SD  =  1.64, CI95% 0.78; 1.39) which were rated similarly.
Recall that we also asked participants to rate the expressions 
on perceived anger since disgust is often seen as also reflecting 
anger to some degree. Indeed, expressions of disgust were 
rated as angrier (M  =  4.04; SD  =  1.56, CI95% 3.73; 4.36) than 
all other expressions with happiness seeming least angry 
(M = 1.24; SD = 1.67, CI95% 0.92; 1.58) and sadness (M = 2.27; 
SD = 1.81, CI95% 1.94; 2.64) and neutrality (M = 2.56; SD = 1.81, 
CI95% 2.2; 2.93) rated equally in-between. Finally, neutral 
expressions were rated as most neutral (M  =  4.06; SD  =  1.61, 
CI95% 1.17; 1.76) with sadness (M  =  1.15; SD  =  1.68, CI95% 
0.91; 1.53) rated similarly to disgust (M  =  0.98; SD  =  1.40, 
CI95% 0.7; 1.26); happiness (M  =  1.47; SD  =  1.54, CI95% 1.17; 
1.76) was seen as somewhat more neutral than disgust. A 
significant main effect also emerged for gender, F(1,403) = 4.31, 
p  =  0.039, ηp2  =  0.01, such that women seemed somewhat 
sadder (M = 2.7; SD = 2, CI95% 2.54; 3.03) then men (M = 2.44; 
SD  =  2.16, CI95% 2.21; 2.66). Overall, all expressions were 
perceived as intended. Further, as expected, expressions of 
disgust were perceived as reflecting a moderate level of anger.
Perceived Willingness to Engage in Risky 
Behaviors
As in Study 1, we  first assessed the internal consistency of 
each of the subscales of the modified DSOPERT that we  used 
in our study. Scores ranged from α  =  0.71 to α  =  0.86 
(αsocial  =  0.71, αrecreational  =  0.86, αfinancial  =  0.8, αhealth/safety  =  0.83, 
and, αethical  =  0.84, for the social, recreational, financial, health 
and safety, and ethical domains, respectively). Thus, the scale 
showed adequate reliability.
As for Study 1, we  conducted a series of two-way ANOVAs 
with emotion expression (disgust, sadness, happiness, and 
neutral) and gender (male and female) as between-subjects 
factors and ratings of perceived generalized risk propensity 
and risk-taking in each risk domain as dependent variables. 
As shown in Figure  1 and Table  3, a main effect of emotions 
emerged for the generalized risk propensity and for all risk 
domains except for the financial domain. For generalized risk, 
post-hoc tests (p < 0.05, see Table 3), showed that we replicated 
the findings from Study 1  in that participants perceived the 
sad person as less inclined to take risks relative to persons 
in any other condition. The happy person was judged to 
be  more inclined to take risks than the neutral person but 
not more than the disgusted person. The latter conditions were 
not significantly different.
Turning to the ratings of perceived risk-taking willingness 
in each risk domain, as in Study 1, expressions of sadness 
made the person seem least likely to engage in risky behavior 
in the social and recreational domains. On the other hand, 
in Study 1 for the social domain, this was the case only 
for men; in Study 2, this was the case for both men 
and women.
However, unlike in Study 1, sadness did not have an effect 
on the perceived likelihood to engage in risks in the financial 
domain. This was the case for all emotional expressions in 
this study. Given this generalization of all emotions, we suspect 
that at the time we  conducted the study, some real-world 
event suggested that this was a bad time to take financial 
FIGURE 1 | Means and standard errors for perceptions of willingness to take risks as a function of emotion expression for each risk domain – Study 2.
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risks and that this information overrode the effect of the 
emotional expression.
Disgust reduced perceived risk proneness relative to 
neutrality only for the recreational domain. For all other 
domains, ratings were similar to those in the neutral expression 
condition. That disgust did not have an effect on health 
and safety risks seems to contradict the notion that the 
function of disgust is to avoid contamination (Tybur et  al., 
2013; Tybur and Lieberman, 2016; Sparks et  al., 2018). 
However, the health and safety related scale items were not 
related to risks associated with contamination. Rather, they 
were about risking one’s health or safety by using illegal 
drugs, excessive alcohol drinking, engaging in unprotected 
sex, not wearing a seatbelt while being in a car, or a helmet 
when riding a motorcycle, or sun exposure without sunscreen. 
Also, as noted above, disgust expressions were also rated 
as showing considerable anger, and in Study 1 anger expressions 
also had no impact on perceived risk-taking likelihood in 
the health and safety domain relative to neutrality. Further, 
the failure to find an effect of disgust for the ethical domain 
speaks against its possible function in this context as suggested 
by Tybur et  al. (2013).
However, expressions of disgust reduced perceived risk 
proneness in the recreational domain relative to neutrality and 
happiness (but not sadness, which was still lower). This could 
suggest a general tendency to see people who experience a 
negative emotion as less likely to engage in recreational activity 
to the extent that they take risks.
In turn, emoters who showed happiness were considered 
to be  more likely to take risks in the recreational domain 
relative to sadness and disgust but not relative to neutrality. 
Further, happiness was the only expression that reduced perceived 
willingness to take risks in the ethical domain. One reason 
could be  that happy people are perceived as unmotivated to 
take risks that can hurt them and ruin their mood, as suggested 
by research that examined the link between felt happiness and 
risk-taking behavior (Isen and Geva, 1987). Finally, expressions 
of happiness reduced the perceived willingness to take risks 
in the health and safety domain relative to neutrality and 
disgust but not relative to sadness.
Next, we  examined whether women and men were perceived 
differently in terms of willingness to take risks, in general, as 
well as in specific life domains. In this context, the effects were 
as expected and similar to those found in Study 1. That is, 
women, overall, were judged to be  less likely to take risks than 
men were. This was also true when looking at specific risk domains 
except for the ethical and social domains in which men and 
women were seen as equally likely to take risks (see Table  4).
In sum, as expected and as in Study 1, emotion expressions 
were used as cues for observers’ estimates of the likelihood 
that the expressers will engage in risky behavior. In particular, 
we replicated the finding that sadness overall reduces perceived 
risk proneness. At the same time, as expected, specific emotion 
effects varied between risk domains.
However, not all expected effects were found, especially with 
regard to disgust expressions. Disgust only reduced perceived 
risk proneness in the recreational domain. Especially the failure 
of disgust expressions to impact on perceived risk proneness 
with regard to health and safety, and the ethical domain is 
puzzling as the hypothesized core functions of disgust relate 
to these domains as noted above.
One possible reason may lie in the stimuli themselves. In 
fact, the disgust expressions we  used also signaled anger. 
This is not uncommon even for pretested disgust expressions 
(e.g., Du and Martinez, 2011). That the effects of disgust 
expressions on perceived risk proneness largely matched the 
results for anger expressions, as found in Study 1, supports 
this possibility. As such, the anger component in these 
expressions may, at least to some degree, obscure the unique 
effect of disgust expressions. In fact, so-called secondary 
emotions, emotions perceived in addition to the target emotion, 
have been shown to affect observers’ perceptions in meaningful 
ways (Hess et  al., 2016; Hareli et  al., 2018).
To explore the contribution of anger versus disgust perceptions 
to perceptions of potential risk-taking, we  conducted an 
exploratory analysis using perceived emotion ratings instead 
of the emotion expression condition. For this, ratings of perceived 
disgust, anger, sadness, happiness, and neutrality were used 
as predictors of the perceived willingness to engage in risky 
behavior in each of the life domains. For this analysis, we used 
the lm function of R (R Core Team, 2018) and lm.beta (Behrendt, 
2014). As can be  seen in Table  5, the results are very similar 
to the results of the previous analyses, but they allow us to 
assess the differential effect of perceived disgust and anger. In 
addition, this analysis provides a better sense of the direction 
of the effect of each type of expression on perceived risk 
willingness for each risk domain.
First, perceived anger had a stronger impact on the perceived 
likelihood to engage in risky behavior than perceived disgust. 
This is true for all domains except for the recreational domain 
for which both anger and disgust had no effect. Further, 
perceived disgust had a unique effect on perceived risk taking 
in the social domain and to some degree in the ethical domain. 
In addition, the direction of this effect was identical to the 
effect of perceived anger, namely, a higher degree of perceived 
TABLE 4 | Perceptions of the willingness to take risks as a function of target 
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disgust and or anger increased the perceived likelihood of the 
person to engage in risky behavior in these domains. As such, 
despite the theoretical function of disgust to avert risky behavior 
in these domains (Tybur et  al., 2013; Tybur and Lieberman, 
2016; Sparks et al., 2018), this was not what observers concluded. 
If anything, the reverse was the case. Finally, this analysis also 
suggests that the effect of perceived happiness is mostly in 
the direction of increasing perceived risk taking except for 
the domain of ethics. What also stands out from this analysis 
is that neutrality contributes quite substantially and positively 
to the perceived likelihood of taking risks.
Overall, our data from Study 2 revealed that emotional 
expressions are perceived by observers as indicative of the 
willingness of the expresser to engage in risky behavior. More 
importantly, we were able to demonstrate that the effect of specific 
expressions of emotions on perceived willingness to engage in 
risky behavior is not uniform across different risk domains.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Emotion expressions signal the likely behaviors of the emoter 
(Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Fontaine 
et al., 2007; Scherer and Grandjean, 2008). Much of the research 
on perceived action tendencies has focused on abstract actions 
that are not related to a specific context. By contrast, in this 
research, we  show that observers also use this information 
when considering behavior in a specific context even when 
this behavior does not directly represent the action tendency. 
Specifically, we  investigated whether observers would translate 
the general behavioral tendencies associated with specific 
emotions into aspects of risk-taking behavior.
Whereas prior research has considered how the naïve 
knowledge of the relation between emotion antecedent events 
and the resulting emotion is used by observers to make sense 
of emoters and their situation (Hareli and Hess, 2010, 2019; 
de Melo et  al., 2014; Hareli, 2014; ), little is known about the 
use of emotion-specific actions tendencies to predict specific 
behaviors. In the present research, we  examined how (and 
whether) expressions of emotions influence judgments of the 
expressers’ willingness to engage in risky behavior. We predicted 
that specific emotions, because they are associated with specific 
behaviors in people’s naïve theories, can be  used to estimate 
how willing a person would be  to take risks.
In line with this idea, our findings demonstrated that observers 
judge others’ risk proneness on the basis of incidental emotions 
that others express. In two studies we  found that emotion 
expressions had a systematic impact on observers’ ratings of 
the expressers’ risk proneness. This was the case both for general 
risk proneness and for risk proneness in specific domains. Further, 
we  found that the effect was not uniform across different risk 
domains. In particular, expressions of anger resulted in higher 
perceived risk proneness in the ethical and social domains. By 
contrast, sadness reduced perceived risk proneness in the financial 
domain (Study 1 only), as well as the recreational and social 
domains. Happiness expressions reduced perceived risk proneness 
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but did not increase it relative to neutrality in the recreational 
domain. Finally, disgust expressions had a relatively limited 
unique effect on risk perceptions that was limited to social risks.
A regression analysis with perceived emotions as predictors 
indicated that perceived neutrality has a strong impact on the 
perception of risk proneness. As such, this adds to the notion 
that neutrality is not the simple absence of emotions and does 
not convey any message (Carrera-Levillain and Fernandez-Dols, 
1994). In the present context, neutrality can be  conceived of 
as a state of “coolness.” That is the person is calm and has no 
worries and hence may be more likely to engage in risky behavior.
In the present study, we  manipulated emotional expression 
by showing participants photos of standardized facial expressions 
of emotions. However, we  do not assume that the results are 
specific to facial expressions. Rather we assume that the results 
readily generalize to situations where emotions are expressed 
vocally or posturally or where emotion information is provided 
verbally by using a label.
Doctors, lawyers, parents, and employers are often called 
upon to make (crucial) decisions for their patients, children, 
clients, and prospective employees. The information they integrate 
into their decision-making when they have to estimate others’ 
willingness to take risks is of key importance. Research so far 
has focused on stereotype information (Siegrist et  al., 2002) 
and the self (Hsee and Weber, 1997) as anchors for such 
judgments as well as for the accuracy of such judgments (Roth 
and Voskort, 2014), and have largely failed to examine the 
role emotions might play in the process. Our findings clearly 
indicate that a person’s emotional expression is used when 
judging their willingness to take risks, and furthermore, that 
the judgment also depends on the risk domain. This extends 
previous research on the cues that observers can use to 
understand how a person may behave in a given context.
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